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VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS-TOWARD
A THEORY OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY UNDER
"FORESEEABLE AND INSURABLE LAWS": III*
ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIGt
IN a number of recent articles I have tried to show that the "place of harm"
formula of tort conflicts law, propagated in the Restatement, is partly incorf ect
and partly in need of a new rationalization. More specifically, I have tried
to show that in all tort conflicts law the lex fori should be restored to its
historical function as the basic rule;" that other laws will come into play
primarily, and perhaps only, in those exceptional situations where either
party has been forced into a forum with an unfavorable law by the prevailing
law of jurisdiction; and that the primary auxiliary laws in such cases are on
the one hand the law of the place of conduct for admonitory tort liabilities,2
and on the other hand laws reasonably "foreseeable and insurable" for tort
liabilities which primarily serve to distribute the losses caused by modern
mechanical "enterprise." In the two earlier Articles of this series I have
developed this latter theme with regard to the liability of motorists to their
guest passengers, 3 and the liability of suppliers to their ultimate consumers."I
The present Article will offer a similar analysis for another important type
of "enterprise liability," that loosely called vicarious liability. Within this
field, perhaps the most important liability in the present-day law of conflict
of laws is the statutory liability of the owner of an automobile for injuries
caused by the negligence of its operator.5 This liability will therefore be the
*The last in a series of three articles. The first two appear in the present volume at
pages 595 and 794 respectively.
tWalter Perry Johnson Professor of Law, University of California (Berkeley).
1. See Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-The Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 Micu.
L. REv. 637 (1960) ; Ehrenzweig, Lex Fori.-Exepton or Ruler, 32 Rocv Mr. L. REV. 13
(1959). See also Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forumn, 58 COLU,1. L. RM.
964 (1958); Kelso, The Process of Analyzing Choice-of-Law Problems, 1959 WASH,
U.L.Q. 37, 51-63; Kramer, Interests and Policy Clashes in Conflict of Laws, 13 Rumiis
L. Ray. 523 (1959) ; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. Rrv. 657,
668-75 (1959).
2. See Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts, 36 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1951) ; Ehrenzweig, Alienation of Affections in the Conflict of Laws (article to be
published in the Cornell Law Quarterly for Spring 1960).
3. Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of Ent'rprise
Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": I, 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).
4. Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of
Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 11, 69 YALE L.J. 794 (1960).
See also Ehrenzweig, Alternative Actionability in the Conflict of Laws of Enterprise
Liability, 63 JuviD. REv. 39 (1951).
5. For a list of statutes, see KUNsTaLR, AcCMIENTs 82 (1954).
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primary topic of this study, though related problems, most of which will be
discussed incidentally, invite similar solutions. These latter problems include
those raised by the family-car doctrine, the classic liability of the master for
his servant, the liability for animals, other enterprise liabilities without fault.
and such fast disappearing curiosities as the husband's liability for his wife',
torts.
According to the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, "each state has
legislative jurisdiction 6 to determine the legal effect of acts done or event,
caused within its territory."' 7 And, "except in the case of harm from poison,
when a person sustains bodily harm, the place of wrong is the place where the
harmful force takes effect upon the body." s Under these formulae one would
expect that vicarious liability would be determined by that law which had
"legislative jurisdiction to determine the legal effect" of the accident, namely
the law of the place "where the harmful force takes effect upon the body."
Not necessarily so, say the Restaters: "In order that the law of the state of
wrong may apply to create liability against the absentee defendant, he nua t
in some way have submitted to the law of that state."9
Such a rule clearly presupposes a function of vicarious liability keyed to
the defendant's action. It has long been recognized by both courts and writers,
however, that this liability is one devised primarily for the victim's protection
and that any test of authorization "should be measured objecii,ly (so as to,
correspond with the limits of the social policy behind imposing vicarious
liability) and not in terms of the employer's wish to limit his own liability.'"
Concerning the automobile owner's liability, there has thus become prevalent
at least in domestic law a "willingness to disregard the owner's limitations
on authority once the court is convinced that they pertain to the mere manner
of operating a vehicle."" The owner may therefore "be held where his bor-
rower (though having consent to begin with) uses the car ...in a forbidden
place .... "12 This postulate is in keeping with one of the oldest rationalization.,
of all vicarious liability according to which "I am liable" because "I set the
whole thing in motion, and what my servant does being done for my benefit
and under my direction, I am responsible for the consequences of doing it."12
That these policies governing the domestic rules of vicarious liabilities a.,
such are inconsistent with the "submission test" offered by the Restatement
6. See EHRFNzwEIG, CoNFLICt OF LAws 8-9 (1959), for a criticism of the use of this
phrase and concept.
7. RESTATEmENT, COmLICT OF LAws § 377, comment a (1934).
8. Id. at 455.
9. Id. § 387, comment a. At the 1928 meeting of the American Law Institute tii,
question was "still doubtful." RSTAEM=ENT, CONFL-CT OF LAws § 418, illustration a, at 64
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1928).
10. 2 HARPER & JA.mEs, ToRTs § 26.7, at 1380 (1956).
11. 2 id. § 26.16, at 1425.
12. Ibid. See also Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLum. L. REv. 716, 726 (1923).
13. Duncan v. Findlater, 6 Cl. & F. 894, 910, 7 Eng. Rep. 934, 940 (H.L. 1839). See
also 2 H'aRER & J~AsIs, TORTS § 26.5, at 1370-74 (1956).
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and leading texts for the solution of conflicts cases in this field, should, at
the outset, put us on guard as to the accuracy of this test. The attempt will
be made in this Article to show that the authorities which apparently underlie
this test, though supported, if not created by, such outstanding judges as
Brandeis and Learned Hand, may and must be discounted as the outgrowth
of a brief conceptualist era, and that this entire field may and should, therefore,
be considered as one of first impression. It will further be shown that, so
considered, the submission test should be replaced by a test based on reason-
able insurability-a standard which should govern enterprise liability in general.
Doctrine
In Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp.,'4 the leading case on the subject, Judge
Learned Hand made application in New York of the owner's liability law of
Ontario, the state of the accident, contingent upon whether the defendant owner
had authorized the operator to act for him in that state, on the grounds that
in the absence of such authorization, Ontario law would have "to reach beyond
its borders, for the only acts by which the defendant connected itself with ...
[the operator] were in New York."'15 This reasoning, like the Restatement
formula modeled on it, assumes that the defendant can only be made liable
for an "act." Obviously, such a basis of liability could have been required by
the law of New York or Ontario, but it may not be stated as a postulate a
priori. Such a postulate would, in the absence of an "act" of authorization,
exclude both application in Ontario of Ontario law even if that law called
for such application to all Ontario plaintiffs or to all Ontario accidents, and
application in New York of New York law even if that law called for such
application to all New York defendants or to all foreign accidents. On the
other hand, if there was authorization, the New York court might have to
apply the Ontario statute to all Ontario accidents even though all parties were
New York citizens and thus had clearly not relied on, or even expected, appli-
cation of Ontario law.
Judge Hand sought support for his a priori reasoning in Mr. Justice
Brandeis' opinion in Young v. Masci.1 MVasci involved a New York statute
which provided for liability of the owner of a motor vehicle for any harm
"resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle .... in the
business of such owner ... , by any person legally using or operating the same
with the permission... of such owner.'1 7 The Court upheld as constitutional
the application of that statute in New Jersey to the claim of a New York
resident for harm caused in New York by an automobile driven to New York
with the New Jersey owner's permission granted in New Jersey. Today
nobody would doubt the constitutional right of a New Jersey court to adopt
14. 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
15. Id. at 943.
16. 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
17. Id. at 256.
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or reject a conflicts rule referring it to the law of the place of the accident and
plaintiff's domicile.' s But 1933 was the time of the climax of the ideology
of vested rights and legislative jurisdiction.10 Only thus may we explain how
defendant could have hoped to succeed with his claim of an immunity acquired
in New Jersey "by virtue of the contract of bailment made there, - " to the
exclusion of "the power of New York to make the absent owvner liable . 2.3.."21
Only thus may we explain why the Court found it necessary to base applica-
bility of the New York statute on the ground that, when the New Jersey owner
"gave permission to drive his car to New York, he subjected himself to the
legal consequences imposed by that State upon ... negligent driving ....
Whether we must consider this argument still valid is doubtful since the under-
lying concepts of vested rights and legislative jurisdiction have since been
abandoned. 23 But whatever be the aiswer to this question, the Schcr court
recognized that it could not rely on the constitutional argument of .llasri, since
that case had not decided whether application of the law of the place of accident
would, in the absence of "subjection," violate due process.2 4 Accordingly, Hand
invoked the Masci case as having established a nonconstitutional rule of choice
of law, although, contrary to the reasoning he employed, it Was by no means
"inevitable that the opinion [in Masci] should [be] read equally as one ...
on the conflict of laws."'2
Be this as it may, both Masci and Scheer have lost whatever standing they
may have had as precedents, if for no other reason than that they announced
a federal conflicts rule and such rules are no longer binding on either state
or federal courts.2 G To be sure, one later case decided by Judge Hand briefly
echoes the Scheer language. In Sieginaun v. Meyer,2- decision was for the
18. See EHREzwEoG, COxFLicT op LAWS 13-14 (1959), as to Mr. Justice Brandeis'
views expressed in other cases.
19. Id. at 8-9.
20. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258 (1933).
21. Id. at 256.
22. Ibid.
23. See Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governuntal Inh'r sts and
the Judicial Fuzction, 26 U. CHL L. REv. 9, 71 n283 (1958).
24. Authorization was recently held a constitutional requirement in an intrastate case.
In Frankel v. Cone, 214 Ga. 733, 107 S.E2d 819 (1959), 10 MERcER L. REv. 338, a Georgia
owners' liability statute was held to violate due process since in the court's view it made
an owner liable for the negligent conduct of another, even though a trespasser was uperat-
ing the vehicle against the express orders of the owner "irrespective of how careful or
free from negligence" the latter was. 214 Ga. at 736, 107 S.F.2d at 822. See also the
peculiar corrective interpretation of the Massachusetts statute which makes registratiun
of an automobile prima fade evidence of responsibility on the part of the registered owner
in Cardell v. Morrison, 138 F. Supp. 817 (D. M1ass. 1956). But see 2 HARPER & J.AES,
ToRTs § 26.16, at 1424 (1956).
25. Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F2d 942, 945 (2d Cir. 1934).
26. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. 7fg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) ; see EHuRENzw-G,
Coxaicr oF LAws 29-30 (1959).
27. 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938). A similar case is Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal.
App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927) (parental liability under Hawaii law unen-
forceable under the forum's public policy).
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New York defendant in a New York action for an assault allegedly committed
by his wife in Florida where he would have been liable under the common-law
rule abolished in New York. Judge Hand, citing Scheer in another context,
argued that a relation of agency would be "determined by the law of the place
where the acts take place which are relied upon to create it."28 But this argu-
ment seems clearly makeweight. Perhaps because the "agency" test would have
subjected the husband to the fortuitous law of the state of the marriage, Judge
Hand relied principally upon his local-law theory under which "it is impossible
for a court to enforce any liability except one created by the law of the court
in which it sits," 20 and found that New York, although it might in general
accept the pattern set by another state, would in this case "not recognize as a
model for any liability which she will impose, a liability imposed by another
state upon an absentee non-resident."8 0 *Gone is "submission" as a condition
for applying the foreign statute. Gone is the foreign statute's "reaching beyond
its borders." And gone is the authority of the Scheer case. For, under the
local-law theory of the Siegmann case, the Scheer court, since its own statute
was similar to that of the place of accident, would certainly have been justified
in holding for the plaintiff on the "model" of the law of Ontario, regardless
of authorization. 31 Without the authority of Scheer and Masci, the Restate-
ment and the judicial reasoning based on it remain without foundation. Since
there is no indication that modem courts would give such reasoning more than
verbal application,8 2 we are free to look for guidance in our search for the law
to the actual holdings of these courts.
The Law
Once we have discounted those numerous cases in which conflicts rules were
invoked though all pertinent laws were identical, or at least not asserted to
be different,3 3 the vast majority of all remaining cases consists of those which,
28. 100 F2d at 368.
29. Id. at 367.
30. Id. at 368. For a more recent assault case, see Burgert v. Union Pac. R.R., 240
F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1957). In that case, however, the pertinent laws do not seem to have
differed as to the scope of vicarious liability.
31. On the local law theory, see generally Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories,
63 HARV. L. REv. 822 (1950) ; ,Morris, The Proper Law of Torts, 64 HARV. L. REv. 881, 891
(1951).
32. Judge Hand relied on Scheer in Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951). The Gratz case, however, involved an intentional tort rather
than enterprise liability. See Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistat'
Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REv. 1, 28 n.121 (1951).
33. In Cardell v. Morrison, 138 F. Supp. 817 (D. Mass. 1956), the court applied the
lex fori to a Connecticut accident, its attention not having been called "to any law of
Connecticut." Id. at 818. In Selles v. Smith, 4 N.Y.2d 412, 151 N.E.2d 838, 176 N.Y.S.2d
267 (1958), judgment for plaintiff was reversed because common-law agency required
under the common law of New York had not been proved. The New York common law
was presumed to be applicable in South Carolina whose law was not proved. (That the
court declared the more liberal New York statute inapplicable was probably rendered
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in accordance with the principle prevailing in conflicts law in general, have
in effect applied the lex fori.34 Courts have reached this result either by re-
ferring to the territorial scope of their own 3r or foreign laws,, or by sinpi)
resorting to their own public policy 37 Among the exceptions are those ca-e.
in which application of the le- fori would not have been appropriate as the
harmless by dicta concerning the likely existence of agency. But the court's reasoning
is misleading.)
Other cases in which no substantive conflict existed include Corban v. Skelly Oil Co.,
256 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1958) (independent contractor) ; Phillips v. Seltzer, 240 Fl2d
857 (2d Cir. 1957) (lessor's liability); Kass v. Gilkerson, 199 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1952):
Haw v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 180 F2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ; Venuto v. Robinson, 118 F2d
679, 682 (3d Cir.) (Goodrich, J.), cert. denicd, 314 U.S. 627 (1941) (independent con-
tractor, lex fori and fex loci probably identical with other pertinent laws) ; Rubenstein
v. Williams, 61 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Herr v. Holohan, 131 F. Supp. 777 (1). MLd.
1955) (automobile owner); Fitzgerald v. Conklin Limestone Co., 131 F. Supp. 532, 535
(D.R.I. 1955) (independent contractor, "general rule") ; D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 r. Supp.
346 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (airplane owner's nonliability stated to be identical under fex firi and
lez loci); 'Molina v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 6 F.R.D. 385, 395 (D. Xeb. 1947)
(vicarious liability for fraud, Mexican law not pleaded); Muraszld v. William L Clifford.
Inc., 129 Conn. 123, 26 A.2d 578 (1942) ; Laughlin v. Michigan Motor Freight Lines, 276
Mich. 545, 268 N.W. 887 (1936); Nepstad v. Lambert, 235 Minn. 1, 50 N.W d 614
(71951) (case of first impression under lex foci, in effect applied fox fori); American
Carrier Corp. v. Avigiano, 123 NJ.L. 490, 9 A.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (fex fori) ; Traub
v. Blum, 263 App. Div. 92, 31 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1941).
Unnecessary conflicts have been created by an inconsistency in the Federal Torts Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-02, 2411-12, 2671-80 (1958), which in defin-
ing "scope of employment" in § 1346, refers to "the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred" (rather than the place of harm), and then, in § 2671, defines the same
phrase when applied to military personnel as "acting in the line of duty." The court
are using federal and state authority interchangeably. See, e.g., Sample v. United States,
178 F. Supp. 259 (D. Iinn. 1959). For the conflicts treatment of governmental liability
abroad, see Schwimann, Internationale Zustdndigkcit und an.u-wondendes Rclht in
Avtshafuingssachen, 81 JuRisTIscHE BLITTER 585 (1959).
34. This includes those cases where the place of wrong was in the forum state. Set,
e.g., Hooten v. Civil Air Patrol, 161 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Wis. 1958). For the thesis that
application of the lex fori is the prevailing principle, see authorities cited note 1 supra.
35. In Kernan v. WVebb, 50 R.I. 394, 148 Atl. 186 (1929), a Rhode Island onncr,'
liability statute was held applicable to a Rhode Island accident although the assumed per-
mission to use the car in that state had been given in Massachusetts, a state lacking a
similar statute. The case therefore does not involve the question whether permission
is required to "subject" the owner to the liability statute of another state, but is based
on the lez fori et loci. But see O'Connor v. Wray, [1930] Can. Sup. Ct. 231, (1930] 2
D.L.R. 899, discussed and approved in 2 BEAr.L ComDnxcr o LAws 1296 (1935); Dia%,
COXFLiCr OF LAws 958 (7th ed. 1958).
36. In Zo\vin v. Peoples Brewing Co., 225 Wis. 120, 273 N.W. 466 (1937), the
owners' liability statute of 'Minnesota, the defendant's state, was held inapplicable being
in terms limited to intrastate accidents. This construction of the Minnesota statute was
approved in Darian v. McGrath, 215 Minn. 389, 10 N.W.2d 403 (1943).
37. In Victor v. Sperry, 163 Cal. App. 2d 518, 329 P.2d 728 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958j,
the California court refused to apply a Mexican owners' liability rule to a Mexican accident
between California citizens, though paradoxically accepting the Mexican limitation oi
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forum state had no relevant contacts with the case.88 The few other cases in
which courts have applied a law other than their own fail to offer the clue for
the formulation of a satisfactory rationale.
For example, in Strogoff v. Motor Sales Co.,30 defendant, Motor Sales Co.,
a Connecticut corporation, when lending an automobile to its office manager
for use during his vacation, had violated a Connecticut registration statute.
Suit was brought in Massachusetts by a Massachusetts resident for injuries
sustained in a Massachusetts accident. Plaintiff attempted to invoke a Massa-
chusetts statute under which anybody who had placed an automobile on the
highways unlawfully was liable as a trespasser. Decision was for the defendant
because he had done "nothing in Connecticut that would create a liability there"
and had not known that his agent "intended to take" the automobile to Massa-
chusetts. 40 Both the result and the reasoning, ignoring plaintiff's right to pro-
tection under his own law, follow the obsolete thought underlying the Scheer
case that owners' liability statutes are primarily concerned with the defendant's
"act."
None but doctrinal, and possibly nonlegal, reasons appear in another case in
which the court refused to apply its own law. A Pennsylvania minister, on
the occasion of visiting his son in New York shortly after having recovered
from an illness, gave permission to his son and the son's fiancee to use his car
(then garaged in New York) for a trip to New Jersey. In an accident in the
latter state the son was killed. His fiancee and her mother attempted to recover
for the daughter's personal injuries by suing the Pennsylvania owner in New
York under the New York owners' liability statute. The court dismissed the
suit on the grounds that the New York statute had "no extraterritorial effect,"'n
and no similar statute of New Jersey had been proved. But since Pennsylvania
had a statute similar to New York's, defendant could hardly have claimed
reliance on nonliability and no compelling reason existed to deny application
of New York law. Only the special equities of the case can explain this de-
cision; it should not serve as a precedent for a purely formalistic approach.
damages as to another defendant. Wholesale application of the lex Jori at the outset
would have produced a more equitable result. See also Hudson v. Von Hanem, 85 Cal.
App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
38. See ErRENZWIG, CONFLIcT OF LAWs 1-2 (1959), on the problems created by the
catch-as-catch-can rule of personal jurisdiction. In Rubin v. Schupp, 127 F.2d 625 (9th
Cir. 1942), a Missouri plaintiff and an Oklahoma defendant had agreed in the California
court on the applicability of the owners' liability statute of Missouri, the place of accident.
Even without such agreement the parties should have been permitted to escape the lex fori
which apparently lacked all contact with the case.'
39. 302 Mass. 345, 18 N.E.2d 1016 (1939).
40. Id. at 345, 18 N.E.2d at 1017. But cf. Cardell v. Morrison, 138 F. Supp. 817, 819
(D. Mass. 1956), assuming that the Massachusetts courts would give "extraterritorial"
application to a Massachusetts statute which made registered ownership prima fade evi-
dence of responsibility.
41. Cherwien v. Geiter, 272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E2d 185 (1936). See also Miranda v.
Lo Curto, 249 N.Y. 191, 163 N.E. 557 (1928); Comment, 21 CoRNEL. L.Q. 303 (1936).
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We agree with the dissent in the lower court, which argued that "the law of
the forum in respect... of fundamental liability should be applied."-' English
law continues to support this conclusion.4 3
The need for restoring the lex fori to its proper place is apparent not only
in the Scheer, Masci, and Sieginann cases with their doubtful "authorization"
theory or in cases such as the two just discussed in which dogmatic deviation
has produced the wrong result, but also in those cases where courts were able
to reach a desirable result by resorting to one or several of our conflicts cure-
als such as renvoi, public policy, or recharacterization. The last technique
may be exemplified by reference to the much-praised and much-maligned case
of Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co.44 In that case the Connecticut
court held defendant renting agency liable under a Connecticut statute for
harm caused by one of its customers to a passenger in Massachusetts. 45 Could
not the court have simply applied its own law in the absence of a compelling
reason to the contrary? Could defendant seriously have been heard with the
claim that plaintiff's right, if any, had to vest under the law of Massachusetts,
the fortuitous place of accident? Clearly the defendant could not rely on any
expectation of the applicability of a more lenient law than that of Connecticut.
And yet the court, beset by the doctrinal compulsions of its time, had to resort
to a characterization of its problem as one of contract in order to invoke the
law of Connecticut as that of the place of contracting.
This technique would compel denial of the claim of a Connecticut citizen
brought in a Massachusetts court on a Connecticut accident against a Massa-
chusetts renting agency because Massachusetts law had become part of the
contract. In view of its fortuitous basis this result would be as unsatisfactory
as the opposite one which would be reached under a delictual place of harm
rule. To avoid it, the Massachusetts court would have to resort to a device
chosen by the Levy court more than twenty years later when it confirmed
applicability of the same Connecticut statute in a suit against Rhode Island
citizens on a Massachusetts accident involving a truck registered in Rhode
42. Cherwiven v. Geiter, 244 App. Div. 814, 815, 279 N.Y. Supp. 553, 554 (1935) (dissent-
ing opinion) (contractual characterization). Concerning the owners' liability law of Pennsyl-
vania under which defendant had to expect and insure against such liability, see Herr v.
Holohan, 131 F. Supp. 777 (D. Md. 1955).
43. See Liverpool, Braz. & River Plate Steam Nay. Co. v. Benham, LR. 2 P.C. 193
(1868) (The "Halley") (shipowner's liability for his pilot's negligence denied under the
lex fori) ; accord, O'Connor v. Wray, [1930] Can. Sup. Ct. 231, [1930] 2 D.LR. 899. But
cf. The M. Moxham, 1 P.D. 107 (C.A. 1876), reversing 1 P.D. 43 (1875) (lx loci appli-
cable as defense to lex fori liability). See generally DicEY, CoxNLicr OF LAws 958 (7th ed.
1958).
44. 108 Conn. 333, 143 At. 163 (1928). For criticism of this case on dogmatic grounds,
see, e.g., Hanseman v. Hamilton, 176 F. Supp. 371 (D. Colo. 1959); Goomaicn, Co,rucr
OF LAws 279-80 (3d ed. 1949). But cf. the excellent analysis in SruMAa, CoIrNtcr oF
LAws 204-05 (2d ed. 1951); Morris, The Proper Law of Tort, 64 HAv. L. REv. 880,
889 (1951).
45. On this type of legislation, see generally Comment, 2 Vm. & MAnY L REv. 284
(1959).
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Island and garaged in Connecticut. The court conceded that the rental agree-
ment might have been entered into in Pennsylvania, but held the contract
subject to the law where it was "to be performed or to have its beneficial opera-
tion . . . -46 This law was that of Connecticut because "the truck could not
be operated in either Massachusetts or New York until it had covered, in
Connecticut, the distance from the place where it was kept to the state line."' 17
Reference to the nondisplaced law of the forum would have been easier. In
ascertaining the existence and scope of exceptions from the applicability of
that law in this field, we shall have to disregard judicial language and try to
formulate the true rationale of the available decisions.
Rationale
The following rationalization of the Levy case, it is submitted, would pro-
duce a generally acceptable solution: The Connecticut agency, in calculating
its rates and planning its insurance, certainly had taken into account the law
of Connecticut. Connecticut, presumably, considers its law the basis for a fair
distribution of statistically inevitable accident losses.48 This law was, therefore,
the law properly applicable to any accident caused by one of the agency's cars
kept, rented, and insured in Connecticut; and any more lenient laws prevailing
elsewhere could not benefit the defendant. Wherever injured or resident, the
plaintiff in the Connecticut court can rely on the lex fori which will not admit
of any exceptions.
The problem is more complex in the case of an agency operating under a law
lacking an owners' liability statute of the Levy type. Such an agency will in
the first place calculate and insure its losses in the light of its own law which
will generally limit its liability to losses caused by its negligent employees
within the scope of their employment.4 9 And potential traffic victims resident
in this state, when planning their insurance programs (or, more realistically,
their accident insurers when calculating their premiums), should, and ulti-
mately will, take into account the additional risk of being injured by financially
irresponsible renters (or, more realistically again, with regard to the family-car
doctrine, by financially irresponsible teenagers). But the agency cannot always
rely on its own lenient law. In one case the impact of stricter foreign law,,
is clearly unavoidable. Where the agency consents to its car being taken to
Connecticut, a jurisdiction with an owners' liability law, immunity to the law
46. Graham v. Wilkins, 145 Conn. 34, 40, 138 A2d 705, 708 (1958).
47. Ibid.
48. Admittedly the court in the Levy case preferred to rationalize application of the
lex fori as that of a law primarily designed "to protect the safety of the traffic upon high-
ways by providing an incentive to him who rented motor vehicles to rent them to com-
petent and careful operators . . . ." 108 Conn. at 336, 143 Atl. at 164. But this somewhat
unrealistic rationale was apparently chosen to avoid the place-of-harm rule. Once it is
recognized that the injured person's right is not tied to this rule, but follows the principle
of reasonable insurability, the admonitory reasoning in the Levy case becomes dispensable.
49. Concerning the family purpose doctrine exception and Florida practice, see
PRossER, TORTS 369-71 (2d ed. 1955).
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of the latter state would adversely affect the position of potential victims and
their insurers concerning accidents there. In a Connecticut suit there is little
doubt that the agency will not be permitted to escape application of the basic
law of the forum by claiming its Massachusetts contract under the theory of
the Levy case. But forum law as such should not determine the liability. De-
fendant's reliance both on the law of the forum and on the law of contracting
must fail when suit on the Connecticut accident is brought in Massachusetts.
In all probability, plaintiff will have been forced into the Massachusetts court
by an unsatisfactory law of jurisdiction. He cannot be expected to have insured
against application of the unfavorable law. On the other hand, the Massa-
chusetts agency, when permitting its vehicle to be used in Connecticut, could
and should have foreseen and insured against liability under Connecticut law
to any user of the Connecticut highways properly relying on the protection
of the laws of that state. And this reliance seems as justified for a transient
as for a citizen of the state of the accident.
The only doubtful case could be that of the borrower who drives the car to
an owners' liability state without the owner's consent. In nonconflicts cases
growing concern for the victim has extended the master's liability generally to
include many situations in which the servant has exceeded the scope of his
employment. Such excesses of authority are in effect charged to the master in
most cases in which they are somehow typical for the enterprise and thus fore-
seeable and insurable, as in the case of deviations concerning the "mere manner
of operating." 50 It seems only consistent to treat entering another state as
such a manner of operating, and to hold both master and owner, without regard
to their consent, under any "foreseeable and insurable law." Indeed, few would
believe that, in the Scheer situation, an Ontario court would have hesitated
to apply its own law to the Ontario accident in protecting an Ontario citizen,
merely because the New York owner had not "submitted" to that law. Clearly
the lex fori would have prevailed. Similarly, few would believe that in the
Levy situation, the Connecticut court would have denied the Massachusetts
plaintiff's claim merely because the contract had prohibited use of the rented
car in Massachusetts. And the Massachusetts court should certainly have ap-
plied its own law in the Motor Sales case, notwithstanding the Connecticut
owner's restrictions on the use of the car.5'
50. 2 HARPER & JAmIEs, TORTS § 26.16, at 1425 (1956). On this theory the domicile
test suggested by some continental courts and writers is not acceptable. While this test
will protect the owner or master from unexpected liabilities, see, e.g., 2 Zrrt..xx,
INTERPNATIONALES PRIVATEc=HT 532-44 (1912), it goes too far in extending this protection
to harm foreseeably and avoidably occurring elsewhere without the owner's or master's
consent. See generally 2 RABRE, CoNFucr OF LAWS 268-76 (1947); Lo.zzx, SeLEcrEa
ARrxcLs oN THE Coxmcr oF LAws 374 (1947).
51. Plaintiff, when using the highways of Massachusetts, was entitled to expect the
protection of the laws of that state, and defendant could easily have protected itself against
liabilities under these laws by preventing the automobile from leaving the state, or by
insuring itself against the consequences of use outside. Defendant had no ground on which
he could object to the application of the lex fori, the basic law of tort conflicts.
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"Insurable laws" include at least the law of the defendant's domicile (or, in
automobile cases, the state where his car is permanently kept), the law of the
place of accident, and probably the law of the plaintiff's residence in this or a
contiguous country. Among these laws, then, even in the absence of the lender's
consent, the plaintiff should be able to choose by choosing his forum. But
limits on the application of the lex fori are necessary to exclude undesirable
forum shopping. A Massachusetts plaintiff injured in his own state by a car
rented in a state equally lacking an owners' liability law, should not 'be able to
avail himself of the owners' liability law of Connecticut by 'bringing suit in that
state after acquiring a mere transient jurisdiction over the defendant. Perhaps
this limitation will some day be achieved by a more rational law of jurisdiction
-now in the making-which would exclude transient jurisdiction. 2 Until
then, the defendant must be permitted to prove that Connecticut law was not
one whose impact on its operations could reasonably have been foreseen and
insured against-i.e., that its application to this particular case would be purely
fortuitous. On the other hand, under our present law of jurisdiction, plaintiff
will occasionally have to be given the right to invoke a law other than that of
the forum. In all probability the Connecticut victim of a Massachusetts accident
caused by a car rented from a Massachusetts agency would, in a Connecticut
court, be permitted to rely on Connecticut law. He should not be deprived
of this choice by being unable to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant in
Connecticut and must, in a Massachusetts court, be permitted to rely on Con-
necticut law as one reasonably foreseeable and insurable by the defendant.
On this theory, the Scheer case would have been decided for the plaintiff.
Judge Goodrich has urged this result on other grounds:
If a man sets off a blast of dynamite,5a or keeps a dog,54 either of which
does harm to the plaintiff in another state, . . . the second state's rule
is applied to fix the actor's liability. May not the same rule be applied
52. See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 102-06 (1959) ; Ehrenzweig, The Transient
Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J.
289 (1956).
53. The dynamite cases do not establish a clear conflicts rule. See Dallas v. Whitney,
118 W. Va. 106, 188 S.E. 766 (1936). The law of West Virginia was later found to
be the same as that of Ohio. Britton v. Harrison Const. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.W. Va.
1948). In Cameron v. Vandergriff, 53 Ark. 381, 13 S.W. 1092 (1890), damages were
allowed under Arkansas law for harm caused by a blasting operation in Indian territory.
But the rules of ordinary negligence applied in this case were probably the same under
both pertinent laws. Related railroad spark cases are similarly inconclusive, See Connecti-
cut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 78 N.H. 553, 103 Atl. 263 (1918); Otey v.
Midland Valley R.R., 108 Kan. 755, 197 Pac. 203 (1921); Ehrenzweig, The Place of
Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36
MINN. L. REv. 1, 17 (1951) ; Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of
Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REv. 165, 167-68 (1944). See generally Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1372
(1951).
54. In Fischl v. Chubb, 30 Pa. D. & C. 40 (C.P. 1937), a New Jersey strict-liability
statute was applied to the bite in that state of a Pennsylvania dog by simple reference to
the place of harm rule. When the court in Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109 (1875),
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when the harm comes from the defendant's car and a person to whom
the car is entrusted? The owner has not voluntarily submitted his car
to the operation of the second state's law, but he has voluntarily parted
with it, and it might well be held that the risk of both disobedience of
orders and negligence by the bailee should be on the lender.es
A Florida court has so held with regard to its unique common-law Dangerous
Instrumentality doctrine.56 Defendant Georgia company objected to a juris-
diction claimed on the basis of a nonresident motorist statute in an owners'
liability suit under Florida law inter alia on the ground that it had not con-
sented to the use of the rented vehicle in Florida. Jurisdiction was upheld 5
in the light of a decision of the Florida Supreme Court which stated in part:
When this defendant turns over an automobile to another for a price, he
in actuality entrusts that automobile to the renter for all ordinary purposes
for which an automobile is rented. The fact that the owner had a private
contract or secret agreement with the renter cannot make such restrictions
a bar to the rights of the public. The restrictions agreed upon do not
change the fact that the automobile was being used with the owner's
consent. .... 58
These conclusions cannot remain limited to the lender who has "voluntarily
parted" with the car "for a price." The gratuitous lender, like all motorists,
is also a member of the community of risk.r9 Nor is there a reason for not
ultimately extending liability to the car owner as such to cover harm caused
by his car in the hands of a thief under the law of any state recognizing such
liability, in the same manner as the owner of a dog is thus liable without having
voluntarily parted with him. All that is needed is that the application of the
law imposing such liability be foreseeable and calculable by the defendantco
refused to apply a similar forum statute in a case involving a Massachusetts dog biting
in New Hampshire, it had not yet been affected by the Restatement doctrine and had tu
find refuge in the fact that "the act of the dog" had been committed in New Hampshire.
Should not the true rationale have been the absence of liability insurance which was
available in the Fischl case? See Ehrenzveig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multi-
state Torts: Law and Reason versus the Restatmnent, 36 Mim. L. rcv. 1, 24-25 (1951).
For a dog case with a gratuitous discussion of conflicts rules, see Thompson v. Wold, 47
Wash. 2d 782, 289 P2d 712 (1955). See generally Comment, 1960 Durm L.J. 146.
55. Goomuc, CoNFLicT OF LAws 279 (3d ed. 1949) (the footnotes are mine, not
Judge Goodrich's); accord, 2 RABEr, CONFLICr OF LAws 272 (1947).
56. The doctrine is stated in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86
So. 620 (1920). See also 2 HARPER & JAmEs, TORTS § 26.10, at 1394 n.9 (1956).
57. Bowman v. Atlanta Baggage & Cab Co., 173 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Fla. 1959).
58. Leonard v. Susco Car Rental Sys., Inc., 103 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1958), aff'd, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959).
59. Young v. fasci, 289 U.S. 253, 258 (1933), seems to cover this case. "A person
who sets in motion in one state the means by which injury is inflicted in another may ...
be made liable for that injury whether the means employed be a responsible agent
or an irresponsible instrument." For criticism, see 2 BEAL., Cnwacr OF LAws § 383.1
(1935) ; cf. 2 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAws 269-70 (1947).
60. For railroad and bus operations, calculations (and self-insurance) can easily be,
and are properly, keyed to the laws governing trackage and routing. See, e.g., South-
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Only in rare cases would this condition fail, as for example if a stolen car or
dog caused harm in a faraway country.
The same principles will help in solving such problems as might still arise
under the multiform antiquated law of master and servant. The fellow-servant
rule was hardly defensible when it was introduced in this country.01 Today
it should not seriously be contended that, as the Restatement of Conflicts
would have it,62 an employee could, under this rule, be deprived of a right to
recovery which he would have under the law of his own state, merely because
the rule has been preserved at a fortuitous place of accident. In fact, none of
the pertinent cases has ever so held although the lex loci has occasionally been
applied to permit recovery. 3 Liability under the law of the employee's resi-
dence is certainly reasonably foreseeable and insurable by the employer.04 This
western Greyhound Lines v. Crown Coach Co., 178 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1949) (contribution
statute) ; Price v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 164 Cal. App. 2d 400, 330 P2d 933 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1958) (res ipsa loquitur) ; Stefan v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 16 Ill. App. 2d 468, 148 N.E.2d
606 (1958) (last clear chance) ; O'Leary v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 299 S.W.2d 873 (Mo.
1957) (burden of proof) ; Jones v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 272 S.W.2d 272 (Mo. 1954)
(humanitarian doctrine, last clear chance). But see Hollinquest v. Kansas City So. Ry.,
88 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. La. 1950), applying a strict-liability statute of the forum to a
foreign accident by virtue of a ticket purchased in the forum state. On the other hand, air
carriers whose accidents cannot with certainty be expected to occur in specific territories,
should not be permitted to invoke a more lenient law of the fortuitous place of accident.
Hospitals necessarily operate and insure under the law of their location.
For cases relying unnecessarily on conflicts rules in the absence of conflicts, see, e.g.,
Watn v. Pennsylvania RR., 255 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1958); Bullock v. Pennsylvania Grey-
hound Lines, 261 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Miller v. Pennsylvania R.R., 251 F.2d 376
(D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Hall v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. La. 1955): Brown v.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, decided sub nora. Rhodes v. Barnett, 117 F. Supp. 312,
317 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
For a case deliberately refraining from deciding an unnecessary conflicts question,
see Johnson v. Eastern Air Lines, 177 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1949).
61. See PROSSER, TORTS 380-82 (2d ed. 1955).
62. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 386 (1934).
63. In El Paso & N.W.R.R. v. Comas, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 170, 81 S.W. 760 (1904)
(lez loci identical with lex fori); Rick v. Saginaw Bay Towing Co., 132 Mich. 237, 93
N.W. 632 (1903) ; and Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. P.R.R., 37 Wis. 321 (1875), plaintiff
recovered under the lex foci. The only support for the Restatement rule as to denial of
recovery seems to be a dictum in De Harn v. Mexican Nat'l Ry., 86 Tex. 68, 23 S.W. 381
(1893). In Baruch v. Sapp, 178 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1949), plaintiff was denied recovery
by the South Carolina court against a South Carolina resident under the Kansas fellow-
servant rule. But not only was plaintiff's decedent a Kansas resident, but South Carolina
law was probably the same as Kansas law. See S.C. CoxsT. art. 9, § 15. Moreover,
the court had found "a grave question" whether defendant was not entitled to a directed
verdict because of decedent's misconduct. 178 F.2d at 386. Alabama Great So. R.R. v.
Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892), denying recovery to an Alabama brakeman against
an Alabama corporation for injuries sustained in Mississippi, under the Mississippi fellow-
servant rule, though an Alabama statute would have permitted recovery, was based in
part on a construction of that statute, and can probably be discounted as the product of
early judicial antilegislative attitudes.
64. This test, rather than the place-of-wrong rule should also be applicable to the
scope of employment within which the master is liable. But see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
[Vol. 69:978
1960] ENTERPRISE LIABILITY-VICARIOUS LIABILITY 991
conflicts theory of reasonable insurability is, as has been shown in the two
previous studies, in accord with that suggested for other kinds of enterprise
liability. 65
The test urged for the scope of enterprise liability in general becomes appli-
cable to its -territorial scope:
We are ... looking ... for risks that may fairly be regarded as typical
of or broadly incidental to the enterprise he has undertaken .... [O]ne
of the purposes for such a quest is to mark out in a broad way the extent
of tort liability (as a cost item) that it is fair and expedient to require
people to expect when they engage in such an enterprise, so there can be
some reasonable basis for calculating this cost.00
"Viewed in this perspective, the master should seldom indeed be exonerated
when his affairs are being furthered by the use of an unauthorized vehicle.""7
Here, as all through the law of vicarious liability, the "authority" test must
fail as based on a fiction prompted by an archaic insistence on some "act" or
even fault on the defendant's part to justify his liability.11 Once this anachro-
nism is discarded, the lex fori supplemented by a test of reasonable insurability
emerges as the rationally applicable law.
OF LAws § 387, comment b (1934), and to the definition of an independent contractor
exempted from this liability, id. § 387, comment e. Laughlin v. Michigan Motor Freight
Lines, 276 Mich. 545, 268 N.AN. 887 (1936), the only case cited in support of the Re-
statement rule on the first proposition in GOODRICH, CoNucr or LAws § 98, at 278 (3d
ed. 1949), is not in point, and involved questions as to which the pertinent laws did not
differ. See also Corban v. Skelly Oil Co., 256 F2d 775 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Venuto v. Robin-
son, 118 F2d 679 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 6-7 (1941); Fitzgerald v. Conklin
Limestone Co., 131 F. Supp. 532 (D.R.I. 1955).
65. See Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of La-s-Toward A! Theory of
Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": I, 69 YALE LJ. 595 (1960) ;
Ehrenzweig, Products- Liability in the Conflict of Lazes-Toward a Theory of Enterprise
Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws": 1I, 69 YALE LJ. 794 (1960).
66. 2 HARPER & JAEs, ToRTs § 26.7, at 1376 (1956), approving the typicality test
suggested in EHRENzEWIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULTT 52-54, 58-61 (1951).
67. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 26.7, at 1378 (1956).
68. See 2 id. § 26.7, at 1379, 1384; 2 RABER, CONFuCT OF LAWS 271-75 (1947). See
generally Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw. U.L. Rnv'. 855 (1953).
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